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(ii) 
COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. DANIEL ENGLISH, ) 
) RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) REHEARING 
vs. ) PRIORITY NO. 16 
STANDARD OPTICAL CO., ) Case No. 900422-CA 
a Utah corporation, ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
APPEAL FROM THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
Respondent W. Daniel English ("English") hereby files 
this Response to Petition for Rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, Utah 
Rules of Appellant Procedure, and as instructed by the Court 
Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals by letter dated July 23, 1991. 
Appellant Standard Optical Company ("Standard") seeks a rehearing 
of the Opinion filed in the above-captioned matter by the Utah 
Court of Appeals on June 25, 1991 on the grounds that the Court 
misapprehended or overlooked two of Standard's arguments. 
Because the Court did not misapprehend or overlook Standard's 
arguments, a rehearing of this matter is not warranted and would 
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constitute a waste of the Court's and the parties7 time and 
resources. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD WAS GIVEN CONSIDERATION FOR ITS AGREEMENT TO FAY 
RENT. 
Standard argues that the Court misapprehended Stan-
dard's argument that English never gave any consideration in 
exchange for Standard's promise to pay rent after September 1, 
1988. It is clear from Standard's Brief of Appellant, Reply 
Brief of Appellant and Petition for Rehearing that Standard 
equates consideration with actual possession. Standard repeat-
edly argues that it was deprived of possession by English and 
that as a result it was not given any consideration for its 
agreement to pay rent. 
Contrary to Standard's assertion, it is Standard who 
misapprehends the law on consideration. It is well established 
that consideration is an act or a promise bargained for and given 
in exchange for a promise. Resource Management Co. v. Weston 
Ranch and Livestock Co. , 706 P.2d 1028, L036 (Utah 1985). The 
definition given to the concept of consideration by the Utah 
Supreme Court requires only bargained for promises. It is not 
necessary for a promisee to fulfill a promise in order for there 
to be consideration; the promise itself is sufficient 
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consideration to form a contract. See Bank of Wallowa County v. 
Gary Mac, Inc. , 619 1= .2d 1310, 1314 (Or. App. 1980). 
There is no question i11 this case that the parties 
exchanged promises. The August 10, 1982, Lease Agreement evi-
dences English's promise to give Standard possession of the 
leased premises for a terr; * ten years, which term included the 
three year period wh i '•"'• •- t i s s u e Accord i in) In 
the terms of the Lease Agreement, the parties promised: 
That in consideration of the payments 
hereinafter reserved to be paid by the Lessee 
to the Lessor and the terms and provisions of 
this agreement to be kept and performed by 
each party to the other, the Lessor does 
hereby . . . lease unto the . . . , who does 
hereby agree to accept as leased property and 
premises and in accordance with the terms and 
provisions of the agreement, the following 
described office space and premises . . . 
To have to hold said premises and office 
space under the terms of this agreement for a 
term of ten (10) years 
Trial Exhibit 4, p. 1 (emphasis added). 
The parties 7 mutual promises entered into upon the exe-
cution of the Lease Agreement clearly constitute sufficient con-
sideration for the agreement. However, even :li f Eng] i si „ had 
denied Standard possession of the premises, that conduct does not 
deprive *.: Lease Agreement previously exchanged consider-
a 11 o ' - < < - e s s i o " Jl S t" a 111J a i i i 
may constitute breach ,t T ;.. :eas> ?r perhaps trespass, 
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neither of which Standard has raised in its Petition for Rehear-
ing as an issue. However, one party's breach of a contract does 
not automatically render the contract unenforceable. Moreover, a 
tortious act by one party to a contract generally does not con-
stitute a defense to another party's action on the contract. 
Centric Corp. v. Drake Building Corp., 726 P.2d 1047, 1053-54 
(Wyo. 1986). 
In any event, English did not deprive Standard of pos-
session of the leased premises. Standard's failure to occupy the 
premises after August 31, 1988, resulted from its own voluntarily 
decision not to do so. Record on Appeal "R." at 189, 191 (Find-
ings of Fact, f 4, 11). A true and correct copy of the trial 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A." The trial court's Findings of Fact, which 
are not challenged on appeal, establish that Standard understood 
that it had the right to possess the premises. On or about June 
30, 1988, Steven Shubach proposed to "sublease" the leased pre-
mises after the expiration of the second three year period of the 
lease term. R. at 190 (Finding of Fact, 5 8). On July 5, 1988, 
Dr. English requested that Standard submit a list of proposed 
1
 Findings of fact which are unchallenged on appeal are 
verities and the appellate court is bound by those findings. 
R.R. Gable Inc. v. Burrows, 649 P.2d 177, 180 (Wash. App. 1982) 
cert, denied 103 S.Ct. 2429, 461 U.S. 957, 77 L.Ed.2d 1316. 
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tenants for sublettinn * premises Findings 
t a c t , „ II I  11 i mi i ! nil I | -8 , S te vei i 
Dr. English indicating his desire to "sublet" the leased premises 
ti i) s o m e o n e other than a subsidiary of Standard optical, R. at 
191 (I indings of Fact, c i Subsequently, on August 1, 1988, 
Steven Shubach wrote another letter to Dr. English proposing * 
p a y a • nei: ta i n moi ltl ill ;  i ei it a 1 amoi n it for 
period of the lease term or , alternatively proposing a "buyout" 
of the lease -at 191 (Finding ~f F ac * * J 6.) On September 
, 1988 ' • - *• ;r , • and Ena . . :ii scussed rental 
amounts, v Finding of Fact, ; Steven Shubach 
later said that he would contact Weight Watchers as a potential 
sublessee I I , i t 1 92 (P i n 3 in j of Fact, f 1 8) 
Not only do the Findings of Fact support the conclusion 
that English and Standard understood that Standard had the right 
to possess the premises as of September 1 1988, they also estab-
lish that, as of that same date, English had not even attempted 
to enter the premi ses arid d i d not attempt to enter the premises 
and have an access key made until English was of the understand-
ing that Steven Shubach had instructed him to find a tenant for 
t h e p r ° ™""»<::: '::i c::: *71 ' i * !i" Hi'! 1" » e ]::: a r t i e s c o n t i i I u e d t D I I e g o t i a t Ei a i : e i 11 
amount. .• . ?l b i n d i n g s of Fac t , f .] 7 -19 . ) 
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Though the record establishes that English did not 
deprive Standard of possession of the leased premises, the proper 
focus in evaluating the issue of consideration is not whether the 
parties performed under the Lease Agreement, but rather whether 
the parties exchanged bargained for promises in the first place. 
That was clearly done in this case. 
II. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT STANDARD DID 
NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 24, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
The trial court correctly declined to address Stan-
dard^ argument that there is no basis for finding Standard lia-
ble for damage or lack of repairs due to noncompliance with Rule 
24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 24(a)(9) 
requires that appellate briefs contain an argument and that: 
The argument shall contain the conten-
tions and reasons of the Appellant with 
respect to the issues presented, with cita-
tions to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on. 
Standard argues in its Petition for Rehearing that 
because it takes the position that there is a complete lack of 
evidence on the issue of damages, it need not present the Court 
with legal authorities or citations to the record. Contrary to 
Standard's position, a party can refer the court to testimony of 
witnesses through whom the missing testimony may have come in so 
that the court has the opportunity of reviewing the relevant 
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portions of the trial transcript to determine for itself whether 
or not there is in fact such a complete lack of evidence. 
More significantly, Standard has failed to identify for 
the Court which of the trial courts rulings it challenges on the 
2 
issue of damages. Because Standard did not challenge any of the 
trial court's Findings of Fact, it appears that Standard contends 
that the trial court erred in its Conclusion of Law, paragraph 3, 
pertaining to Standard's liability for damages to the property. 
However, Standard utterly fails to provide the Court with any 
basis to overturn that or any other Conclusion of Law. 
In its Petition for Rehearing, Standard boldly makes 
the assertion, unsupported by any citation to the record, that 
there was a lack of evidence to support the trial court's ruling 
on damages. In taking this position, Standard entirely ignores 
four Findings of Fact which Standard has not challenged on 
appeal. In those Findings of Fact, the trial court found that 
Standard had failed to maintain the premises in a clean and sani-
tary condition, R. at 196 (Findings of Fact, f 39) , that it had 
removed attachments from the building, R. at 196 (Findings of 
Fact, f 40), that it had failed to keep the furnace in a state of 
2
 Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that 
Petitions for Rehearing, "shall state with particularity the 
points of law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has 
overlooked or misapprehended." 
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reasonable repair, R. at 196 (Findings of Fact, f 41) , and that 
Standard's acts resulted in a damaged ceiling and damaged walls, 
carpets, trim and floor tiles. R at 196-197 (Findings of Fact, 5 
42.) Because Standard did not challenge any of the findings, it 
stands to reason that Standard cannot now challenge the Conclu-
3 
sion of Law which is supported by those unchallenged findings. 
Finally, Standard contends that there was no evidence 
of the condition of the premises at the commencement of the 
lease. As discussed in English's Brief of Respondent, Standard's 
position entirely overlooks the language of the lease which 
unequivocally establishes that the premises were in "good" and/or 
"excellent" repair at the beginning of the lease term. When it 
executed the lease in 1982, Standard agreed, in three different 
places in the lease, to accept the premises in "good" and/or 
"excellent" condition: 
It is mutually understood and agreed 
that the premises herein leased are in a con-
dition of excellent repair. . . 
Trial Exhibit 4, p. 2. 
The lessee does hereby accept the Leased 
Premises in a condition of good repair . . . 
3
 Where the findings of fact are not challenged on appeal, the 
appellate court's review is generally limited to determining 
whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. 
Fuller v. Employment Security Department of State of Washington, 
762 P.2d 367, 369 (Wash. App. 1988). 
-8-
Trial Exhibit 4, p. 2. 
The lessee does hereby agree to accept 
the demised premises in a state of good 
repair . . . 
Trial Exhibit 4, p. 3. 
In view of Standards express acknowledgment of the 
good and/or excellent condition of the premises at the beginning 
of the lease, the trial court had ample evidence on which to con-
clude that the damage found by English had resulted from Stan-
dard's occupancy of the premises. Standard simply has not pre-
sented the Court with any basis to overrule the trial court's 
findings. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Court of Appeals neither overlooked or misap-
prehended Standard's "consideration" and "damages" arguments. 
The trail court's Findings of Fact on both those issues are not 
challenged on appeal and the Conclusions of Law were not errone-
ous as a matter of law. Accordingly, English respectfully 
requests that the Court decline to put the parties and the Court 
to additional time and expense in this matter and deny Standard's 
Petition for Rehearing. English further requests an Order grant-
ing him his reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in 
responding to Standard's Petition for Rehearing. 
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DATED this z day of August, 1991. 
GARY E. CjOCTORMAN 
ELIZABETH S. WHITNEY 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
GARY E. DOCTORMAN (0895) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 West Broadway, Suite 400 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
W. DANIEL ENGLISH, 
) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
STANDARD OPTICAL CO., a Utah ) 
corporation, ) Civil No. 89-0900580CN 
Defendant. ) Judge Michael R. Murphy 
* * * * * * * * 
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Judge 
Michael R. Murphy on December 21, 1989 and continued into Decem-
ber 22, 1989. Plaintiff, W. Daniel English ("Dr. English") 
appeared in person and through his attorney, Gary E. Doctorman of 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer and defendant Standard Optical Company 
("Standard Optical") appeared through its president, Stephen 
Schubach and its general manager, Klaus Rathke, and through their 
attorneys, George Hunt and Kurt Frankenberg of Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau. The court having heard the testimony of the wit-
nesses called by the plaintiff, Fred Burns, Gordon Helstrom, 
Willard Helstrom, Dr. English and Nikkie Dore and the witnesses 
called by the defendants, Stephen Schubach and Klaus Rathke, and 
pursuant to Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the court 
makes the following findings of fact. 
1. On August 10, 1982, Dr. English and Standard 
Optical entered into a written Lease Agreement for the lease of 
commercial real property and a building located at 3525 Market 
Street, West Valley City, Utah. 
2. The significant portions of the signed written 
Lease in controversy are described below: 
(a) To have and to hold said premises 
and office space under the terms of this 
agreement for a term of ten (10) years 
beginning on the first day of the month 
following written notice to lessee from 
lessor and terminating at midnight on the 
last day of the same month 10 years hence 
[i.e. 1992]. 
(b) The Lessee does hereby uncondition-
ally agree to pay as rent for the demised 
premises and to lessor, or order, at West 
Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah, the sum 
of $1,000 each month for 36 months with the 
first such installment to be due and payable 
on or before the first day of September, 
1982, and each installment payment to be due 
thereafter on or before the same calendar day 
during the term of the Agreement. A grace 
period of five days is given for the making 
of such installment payment. 
(c) The monthly rent specified in the 
section above shall be negotiated every 36 
months. 
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(d) It is mutually understood and 
agreed by these parties that the demised 
premises herein will be used by the lessee as 
a retail optical business and lessee does 
hereby agree to use said premises for no 
other purpose without the written consent of 
lessor first had and obtained. However, such 
consent will not be unreasonably withheld. 
(e) It is mutually understood and 
agreed that the premises herein leased are in 
a condition of excellent repair . . . . 
(f) The Lessee does hereby agree to at 
all times during the term of this agreement 
keep the heating and air conditioning units 
in a condition of good repair. 
(g) The Lessee hereby accepts the 
leased premises in a condition of good repair 
and does hereby agree to at all times during 
the term of this agreement to maintain the 
interior of the demised premises and to keep 
the same in a condition of good repair at all 
times, and agrees not to make any alterations 
to the demised premises without the written 
consent of the lessor first had and obtained, 
and then that all such alterations shall be 
made at the sole expense of the Lessee and 
that any such alterations as are then made a 
part of or attached to the building shall 
remain with the premises and become the 
property of the lessor at the end of this 
lease term. 
(h) The Lessee does likewise agree to 
provide suitable floor covering (carpet, 
tile, etc) of his choice in said premises, to 
be responsible for all repairs done or needed 
to be done to the interior of the demised 
premises during the term of this agreement. 
(i) The Lessee does hereby agree to be 
responsible for all breakage to windows and 
doors in the demised premises and not to 
install any signs on the demised premises 
without the permissions of the Lessor. 
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(j) The Lessee shall not sublet any 
portion of the leased premises without the 
written consent of lessors first had and 
obtained. Nor shall the Lessee assign this 
lease in whole or in part without the written 
consent of the Lessors. . . . 
(k) It is agreed that the Lessor will 
not be liable to the lessee on account of any 
damage to any property of the Lessee in the 
demised premises on the count of lack of 
repairs to any equipment in the demised 
premises as is the responsibility of the 
Lessee to repair and maintain, and that the 
Lessor shall have the right to any reasonable 
inspection of the demised premises at any 
reasonable time during the term of this 
agreement. The Lessee does hereby agree to 
at all times keep the interior of the demised 
premises in a clean and sanitary condition in 
accordance with all good and reasonable 
standards of like commercial units. 
(1) It is mutually agreed that in the 
event of the failure, neglect or default of 
the Lessee to make payments herein provided, 
as they become due, or within the grace 
period, that the Lessor shall have the right 
and option to proceed under the terms of the 
following provisions or either of them: 
(m) To declare this agreement termi-
nated and proceed, with or without legal 
process to take possession of the demised 
premises and in which event this agreement 
will be terminated and each of the parties 
will be excused from any further performance 
of the terms and provisions herein set forth, 
or 
(n) To take any action necessary to 
evict the Lessee from the demised premises, 
and to proceed to make any and all necessary 
repairs to the property and to proceed to 
rent the same to any other person, and in the 
event it is necessary for Lessor to take a 
reduction of the rental rate on said demised 
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premises that the Lessee will pay the Lessor 
all expenses, in connection with such 
repairs, re-renting and any loss of rentals 
as may be determined by the rates set forth 
herein. In this respect it is agreed that 
time is of the essence of this agreement and 
that the terms and provisions herein set 
forth will extend to and become binding upon 
the respective heirs, executors, administra-
tors and assigns of these parties, and that 
the Lessee shall have no right to make any 
assignment of any rights under the terms of 
this agreement. 
(o) The Lessee does hereby agree to 
turn said premises back to the Lessor at the 
end of this lease term in as good a condition 
as the premises are at the commencement of 
this lease, with only ordinary wear and 
depreciation being accepted. 
(p) It is mutually agreed that in the 
event it becomes necessary for either party 
to enforce the terms of this agreement with 
court action, after default, that the party 
determined to be in default will pay to the 
opposite party all court costs and reasonable 
attorneys' fees. 
3. On or about September 1, 1985, plaintiff and 
defendant entered into a written addendum to the 1982 Rental 
Agreement specifying a monthly rent of $1,200 to be paid for the 
36-month period beginning on September 1, 1985. 
4, In 1986 and 1987, Standard Optical made the 
decision to convert their optical stores to "super stores" where 
possible and in early 1988 began negotiations with the Valley 
Fair Mall, one block away from the leased premises, and in June, 
1988, executed a lease with Valley Fair Mall for a super store. 
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5. Prior to September, 1988, plaintiff had never 
experienced any problems with Standard Optical promptly paying 
rent. 
6. Prior to June 1988, Standard Optical understood 
the Rental Agreement term to expire at the end of August 1988, 
with an option to negotiate a renewal. 
7. On June 20, 1988, Klaus Rathke, General Manager of 
Standard Optical ("Rathke") told Dr. English that Standard 
Optical was moving to the Valley Fair Mall. Dr. English informed 
Mr. Rathke that the Lease term did not expire in 1988. Mr. 
Rathke expressed he thought the lease term was up and Dr„ English 
referred him to the Lease. 
8. On or about June 30, 1988, Dr. English and Steven 
Schubach ("Schubach") discussed the leased premises and Schubach 
proposed to sublease the premises. Dr. English wrote back that 
he would consider a proposal and responded in writing as the 
Lease agreement required to,consent of the Landlord. 
9. On July 1, 1988, Standard Optical promptly paid 
its July rent to Dr. English. 
10. On July 5, 1988, Dr. English requested that 
Standard Optical submit a list of proposed tenants for subletting 
the premises and suggested a meeting on September 15, 1988 to 
negotiate a new rental amount. 
*.fi-
11. July 17, 1988, was Standard Optical's last day of 
business at the leased premises. 
12. On or about July 18, 1988, Standard Optical moved 
its records and inventory from the leased premises and also moved 
attachments to the building and built-in-cabinets and counters. 
Several large signs were placed on the premises stating Standard 
Optical had moved. Dr. English read the signs and concluded 
Standard Optical had moved. 
13. On July 20, 1988, Schubach wrote to Dr. English 
stating that Standard Optical had abandoned their plans to have a 
subsidiary of Standard Optical sublet the space but wanted to 
sublet it to someone else. 
14. On July 22, 1988, Dr. English wrote to Schubach 
stating that he needed to know more about the proposed subtenant 
before he could approve a subtenant. 
15. On August 1, 1988, Standard Optical promptly paid 
its rent for the month of August. 
16. Also on August 1, 1988, Mr. Schubach wrote to Dr. 
English indicating that Standard Optical intended to negotiate 
for an $800 per month Lease beginning September 1, 1988, and 
alternatively proposing a buy-out of $4,800 to be paid on Septem-
ber 15, 1988. 
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17. On September 26, 1988, Schubach, Rathke and Dr. 
English met to discuss the lease. Dr. English presented a 
document with rent comparables to Schubach. Schubach rejected 
the rent comparables. Schubach commented about rent in his Provo 
and Layton stores. Dr. English suggested if Standard wanted to 
sublease that they should consider calling Weight Watchers. 
Schubach stated "We're not in the leasing business, you are. Our 
business is the optical business." 
18. Schubach later said he would contact Rick Trentman 
of Weight Watchers. Dr. English left the September 26, 1988, 
meeting with the understanding that Standard Optical was not 
going to use the premises as a retail optical shop and that Dr. 
English, who was in the leasing business, should find a tenant 
and the parties would continue to negotiate the Lease amount. 
19. On September 29, 1988, in compliance with his 
understanding that he was to attempt to find a tenant, Dr. 
English had an access key made for the premises and upon entering 
the premises to inspect it he found damage to the Premises. 
20. On October 1, 1988, Standard Optical did not pay 
any rent. 
21. On October 5, 1988, Dr. English sent a notice of 
default to Standard Optical and suggested the parties use the 
same Lease amount until they agreed and that they use MAI 
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appraisers to determine the amount. Dr. English did this because 
he believed Schubach had used Standard Optical's Provo and Layton 
stores as comparisons which Dr. English believed to be 
inappropriate. 
22. No subtenant was ever presented to Dr. English by 
Standard Optical. Further, Stephen Schubach called and left a 
message for Rick Trentman but never made contact directly with 
Rick Trentman of Weight Watchers. 
23. On October 18, 1988, Dr. English changed the lock 
to the premises for the purpose of protecting the tools of the 
repairmen who would be working on the premises. 
24. On October 20, 1988, Standard Optical issued a 
check in the amount of $1600: $800 for September and $800 for 
October rent. Schubach sent this amount because it was where 
Standard Optical left the negotiations. No mention was made that 
it was in response to a Demand Letter. 
25. On October 20, 1988, Dr. English's attorney, Gary 
Doctorman, wrote a letter to Richard and Stephen Schubach at 
Standard Optical Company. The letter informed Standard Optical 
that it was "in violation of the terms of the lease" and that if 
it desired to "remain in possession of the leased premises," it 
should make rent payments for the months of September and 
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October. The amount of rent claimed due was not specified in the 
letter. 
26. Dr. English subsequently returned the $1,600 check 
to Standard Optical because the parties had not yet arrived at an 
agreed amount. 
27. On November 1, 1988, no payment was made. 
28. In the first week of November, 1988, Schubach 
called Dr. English at his home and agreed that Standard Optical 
would pay $1,000 monthly rent. 
29. Each time Standard Optical sought access to the 
property after the locks were changed, access was achieved. 
30. On or about November 7, 1988, Dr. English's office 
gave the key to the premises to an employee of Standard Optical. 
31. On or about November 5 and November 7, Standard 
Optical employees entered into the Premises and removed the 
remaining Standard Optical possessions. 
32. Between September 1, 1988 and January 31, 1989, 
Standard Optical only attempted to enter the premises on November 
5, 1988 or November 7, 1988, and during the first half of Octo-
ber, 1988, on November 4, 1988 and on December 16, 1988. At no 
time that Standard Optical attempted to enter the Leased Pre-
mises were they denied access. Dr. English's actions never 
deprived Standard Optical of access to the premises. 
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33. Sometime between the last week of October and 
before November 10, 1988, subcontractors hired by Dr. English 
commenced repairs to the Premises. At that time Dr. English had 
not yet arranged for any particular tenant to lease the Premises. 
34. On November 21, 1988, Dr. English received $1,600 
in payment, the check markings indicated $1,000 of which was to 
be applied to the September rent and $600 to be applied to a 
partial payment for the October rent. 
35. On November 21, 1988, Standard Optical paid Utah 
Power & Light for electricity supplied to the premises at 3525 
Market Street up through October 18, 1988. 
36. On December 1, 1988, Standard Optical issued a 
check to Dr. English in the amount of $1,000. 
37. On December 2, 1988, Dr. English sent a demand 
letter to Mr. Rathke at Standard Optical requesting "lease 
payments due for October, November and December." In his letter, 
Dr. English also indicated .that he had three prospective tenants 
for the premises. On December 5, 1988, Dr. English received a 
check from Standard Optical in the amount of $1,000. 
38. On December 6, 1988, Standard Optical paid Utah 
Power & Light for electricity supplied to the premises at 3525 
Market Street through November 18, 1988. 
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39. Defendant Standard Optical failed to maintain the 
premises at all times in a clean and sanitary condition in 
accordance with good and reasonable standards of like commercial 
units. 
40. Defendant Standard Optical removed attachments 
from the building. 
41. Defendant Standard Optical failed to keep the 
furnace in a reasonable state of repair. 
42. Dr. English and his contractors1 inspection 
revealed the reasonable need to repair and Dr. English did repair 
at a reasonable cost as indicated as follows: 
(a) The furnace was not working properly and plumbing 
was damaged and Willard Hellstrom charged $619.86 for repairs. 
(b) It appeared that Standard Optical had removed 
numerous fixtures, including built-in-cabinets and counters. The 
removal left large and small holes in the walls, damaged the 
ceiling, walls, and carpets. Also, the removal of the built-in 
cabinets left gaps in the trim. Additionally, Standard had 
failed to fix a plumbing leak damaging the bathroom walls, 
cabinets and left the floor tiles curling. The damage to the 
walls, ceiling, bathroom trim was repaired with like materials. 
The bills for repairs were: Gordon Hellstrom, $2,031.82; 
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Butterfield Lumber, $366.42; Fred Burns, $4,143.30; Perschon, 
$113.99 and Perschon $1,472.01. 
(c) Standard Optical left behind damaged light fix-
tures requiring repair of 34 landholders, replacement of 120 
lamps and other repairs by Willard Hellstrom totalling $1,135.26. 
(d) The above repairs totalled $9,852.66 and Dr. 
English substantially paid these amounts on or before December 
31, 1988. 
43. Dr. English mitigated his damages and re-rented 
the premises for a period of one year to Weight Watchers, Inc. at 
a sum of $990.00 per month commencing the 1st day of July, 1989. 
44. Standard Optical refused to pay rent of $1,400 for 
the rent due in 1988 and has paid no rent in the year 1989. 
45. Reasonable attorneys' fees of $11,968.40 were 
incurred by plaintiff, and plaintiff's expenses and filing fees 
of $75.00f service of process fees of $9.75 and deposition costs 
of $453.45. 
THE COURT HAVING MADE THE ABOVE FINDINGS OF FACT hereby 
enters its Conclusions of Law: 
1. Pursuant to the terms of the written Lease, the 
parties negotiated at the end of the second 36-month term and on 
or about November 2, 1988 the parties agreed that the rent for 
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the next 36-month term from September 1, 1988 to August 1, 1991 
would be $1,000 per month. 
2. Standard Optical failed to pay the rent as agreed 
and breached the written Lease. Dr. English has been damaged in 
the amount of lost rent for the year 1988 in the amount of $1,400 
and for lost rent from January 1, 1989 through the 1st day of 
July, 1990 in the amount of $6,000. Plaintiff is entitled to the 
entry of judgment of these amounts. 
3. Standard Optical breached the written Lease 
Agreement between the parties as they failed to maintain and 
repair the premises, including the furnace, and they removed 
attachments to the building and as a result of their failure to 
maintain and repair, Dr. English reasonably repaired the premises 
at a reasonable cost of $9,852.66. 
4. Dr. English incurred reasonable attorneys' fees in 
the amount of $11,968.40 and is entitled to a judgment for that 
amount. 
5. Dr. English is entitled to prejudgment interest on 
the damages and lost rent at the rate of 10%• 
6. Dr. English incurred court costs in the amount of 
$538.20 and is entitled to a judgment for that amount. 
7. Interest shall accrue on the judgment at the rate 
of 12% from the date of the judgment. 
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8. Plaintiffs failed to meet its burden of proof to 
show defendants failed to negotiate in good faith. 
9. Pursuant to the decision in Reid v. Mutual of 
Omaha Insurance Company, 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (1989), this court 
will impose damage awards based on past events only and does not 
take into account the landlord's mitigation efforts in the future 
and therefore this court retains jurisdiction of this matter and 
awards only those rents that have come due as of the time of the 
trial, which judgment will be immediately enforceable. The rents 
and damages accruing after the trial may be recovered through 
supplemental proceedings for any further rents lost or damages 
incurred imposing the duty upon the landlord to fulfill its 
ongoing duty to mitigate. The initial determination of the 
tenant's liability would govern in the supplemental proceeding. 
DATED this f day of vi>/M/jjfAU . 19_£?. T 
[IAU^X if 
JUDGE MICHAEL R. MURP: 
Approved as to form: 
George A. Hunt 
Attorney for Defendant 
Standard Optical Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to George A. Hunt, Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, 10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 on this <^ f day of January, 199oY^ ^ x 
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